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Abstract 
The proposed model is to configure Byzantine Fault Tolerance mechanism for every SOAP fault message that is 
transmitted. The reliability and availability are of major requirements of Web services since they operate in the 
distributed environment. One of the reliability issues is handling faults. Fault occurs in all the phases of Service 
Oriented Architecture i.e. during publishing, discovery, composition, binding, and execution. These faults may 
lead to service downtime, behaves abnormally, and may send incorrect responses. These abnormalities are 
classified as Byzantine faults in Web services. Even though SOAP specification provides fault handling 
mechanisms, the correctness of the received SOAP fault messages are not known. In this paper, a model is 
proposed to check the correctness of the SOAP fault message received, by incorporating the Byzantine 
agreement for fault tolerance. The existing fault tolerant mechanism detects server failure and routes the request 
to the next available server without the knowledge of the client. The proposed model ensures a transparent 
environment by providing fault handling information to the client. This is achieved by incorporating an active 
replication technique.  
Keywords: Byzantine; Fault tolerance; Replication; SOAP; Web Services 
1.  Introduction 
Web service is a heterogeneous architecture for deploying services in the Web. For effective communication, 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is recognized as a more promising transport protocol for sending 
requests and receiving responses in Web services.  A Web service is a piece of software application whose 
interface and binding can be defined, described, and discovered as XML artifacts.  
Fault handling is a major issue that is been considered in many areas. Service-based applications should 
adopt fault handling mechanisms like fault tolerance to handle errors as propagated by the respective services, 
and ensuring an end-to-end Quality of Service (QoS). Failures may occur because of congestion in networks, 
server load, hardware fault at server end, software failure at server end, denial of service attack etc., Fault-
tolerant frameworks performs fault detection and fault recovery. This is achieved by redundancy. 
In case of Web services the cost for maintaining and recovery from faults is higher than any other normal 
applications and there may be faults that may happen within the Web services as well. Several fault tolerance 
approaches have been proposed for Web services, but the field still requires theoretical foundations, appropriate 
models, effective design paradigms, practical implementations, and in-depth experimentations for building 
highly-dependable Web services (Chan et al. (2006)).  WS-Reliability and WS-ReliableMessaging 
specifications are dealt with faults at the transport level.As per the current research works reported, all the faults 
during the execution of the Web services are handled without the knowledge of the client and also, the client 
does not know whether the received response is an authenticated one. The proposed approach focuses on 
transparent fault handling mechanism by providing information to the client about the current status.  
In general, when a fault is generated, no further processing should be performed. In request-response 
exchanges, a fault message will be transmitted to the sender of the request, and some application level error will 
be flagged to the user (WS-I Basic Profile 1.1). A fault message consists of fault code, fault message, fault 
detail, and fault actor. 
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replication technique for achieving fault tolerance. Two common replication strategies are: (1) passive 
replication and (2) active replication. Passive replication employs a primary replica to process the service 
request first and invokes backup replicas only when the primary replica fails. Active replication invokes all 
replicas at the same time and employs the first properly returned response as the final outcome (Salas (2006)). 
The incorporation of Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) in Web services will address the issues of a) increase 
in malicious attacks in Web applications, b) software faults, c) the growing values of data, and d) provides a non 
fail stop behaviour of services ((Castro and Liskov (1999)), Kotla et al. (2008)). Reduction in the costs of 
hardware and effective practical implementation of BFT replication makes the service providers to incorporate 
into their web servers. For example by default, the Google file system uses 3-way replication of storage, which 
is roughly the cost of BFT replication for f = 1 failures with 4 agreement nodes and 3 execution nodes (Yin et al. 
(2003)). 
2.  Fault Tolerance Mechanisms 
Different phases involved while implementing Web services using Service Oriented Architecture are publishing, 
discovery, composition, binding, and execution. Faults may occur during any stage and their categories and fault 
types are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Fault Categories in Web Services 
Fault Classification  Fault Types 
Publishing  Service Description, Service Deployment 
Discovery  No service found, Wrong service, timed out 
Composition  Incompatible components, timed out 
Binding Authentication  failure,  Accounting problems, timed out 
Execution  Server crash, Incorrect result, timed out 
 
Aghdaie and Tamir  (2001) developed a client transparent fault tolerance model for Web servers. It detects 
server errors and routes the requests to a standby backup server for reducing service failures. G. T. Santos et.al 
(2005) describes active replication technique in Web services. To support consumer transparent fault tolerance, 
the architecture has a central forwarding component that includes the mechanisms responsible for managing 
replicas. It acts as a broker between consumers and providers. To deal with the fault of the forwarding 
component, the architecture has a backup component. In this architecture, the broker is implemented as a Web 
service and it enables consumers to use different brokers. The forwarding component has a configuration system 
for creating groups and uses UDDI tModels for creating service replica groups. The passive replication 
technique is explored in (Liang et al. (2003)). To achieve fault tolerance, some modifications are proposed for 
the WSDL and SOAP standards with the purpose of allowing the specification of Web service replicas and 
redirection of service requests. This approach employs a mediator layer in the Web service architecture, which 
offers the necessary functionalities for managing replicas. Thus, the passive replication approach does not 
depend on modifications in the interface description language and the message interchange protocol of Web 
services. The passive replication approach includes a UDDI extension, but the extended UDDI is compatible 
with the standard. WS-Replication (Salas (2006)) is a framework for seamless active replication of Web 
services, that is, it respects Web service autonomy and provides transparent replication and failover. The 
communication within the framework is exclusively based on SOAP without forcing the use of an alternative 
communication means. WS-Replication allows the deployment of a replicated Web service using SOAP for 
transporting information across sites. Clients invoke a replicated Web service in the same way as they invoke a 
non-replicated one. Internally, WS-Replication takes care of deploying the Web service in a set of sites, 
transparently transforming a Web service invocation into a multicast message to replicate the invocation at all 
sites, awaiting for one, a majority or all replies, and delivering a single reply to the client (Salas (2006)).  
Faults may be classified as transient faults, intermittent faults, and permanent faults. The system faults can be 
fail-silent failures and byzantine failures. These faults can be overcome by applying redundancy and replication 
of services. In this paper, the SOAP faults at the execution phase and Byzantine failures are being dealt with. 
The replication approach is used for fault tolerance. The faults are received as SOAP fault messages as received 
as a payload. 
3.  SOAP Faults 
In Web services, when a fault occurs during the service execution an appropriate SOAP fault message is sent to 
the requester. Fault is an optional sub element of a SOAP Body. This element is been included to intimate the 
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characterized using: 
 
faultCode  : Unique text code for the error. 
faultString  : To specify the error in detailed manner 
faultActor  : A string element to specify the root cause of the fault.  
detail    : Specifies the application specific error messages. 
 
The general format of a SOAP Fault is given as below. 
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<env:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
   <env:Body> 
    <env:Fault> 
   <faultcode  xsi:type="xsd:string">env:Client</faultcode> 
      <faultstring xsi:type="xsd:string">The root cause of the error</faultstring> 
   <faultactor>http://www.abccorp.com</faultactor> 
   <detail>Detailed  error  description</detail> 
    </env:Fault> 
 </env:Body> 
 </env:Envelope> 
 
The fault code values as per the SOAP specification 1.2 are VersionMismatch, MustUnderstand, 
DataEncodingUnkown, Sender and Receiver.  The fault codes Client and Server in SOAP 1.1 specification is 
renamed as Sender and Receiver in SOAP 1.2 specification.  Each category of generic SOAP faults is analyzed 
for tolerating.  The above said fault codes are sent to the client node and to be analyzed, by applying Byzantine 
agreement algorithm. 
4.  Byzantine Generals Problem 
In 1982, Leslie Lamport described Byzantine general’s problem in a paper written with Marshall Pease and 
Robert Shostak (1982). This problem is built around an imaginary General who makes a decision to attack or 
retreat, and must communicate the decision to his lieutenants. A given number of these actors are traitors 
(possibly including the General.) Traitors cannot be relied upon to properly communicate orders; worse yet, they 
may actively alter messages in an attempt to subvert the process. The generals are collectively known as 
processes, the general who initiates the order is the source process, and the orders sent to the other processes are 
messages. Traitorous generals, and lieutenants are faulty processes, and loyal generals, and lieutenants are 
correct processes. The order to retreat or attack is a message with a single bit of information: a one or a zero. 
Byzantine fault tolerance (Lamport et al. (1982)) is a highly reliable replication technique that can tolerate a 
wide range of types of faults. Under a Byzantine fault model, a faulty node may act arbitrarily; this is in contrast 
to the more restrictive crash-fault model, which assumes that a faulty node will simply be unresponsive. 
Although only f+1 replicas are required to tolerate f Byzantine faults if communication is assumed to be 
synchronous and replicas can authenticate messages, this synchrony assumption is not practical for 
environments like the Internet, where there is no a priori known upper-bound on communication latencies 
(Merideth et al. (2005)). Castro–Liskov (1999) proposed a Byzantine Fault Tolerance state-machine-replication 
protocol (Liang et al. (2003)) and its library implementation can be used to create client–server Byzantine-fault-
tolerant applications. This technique works in asynchronous environments. BFT-WS (Zhao (2007)) architecture 
is implemented as an Axis2 module. During the out-flow of a SOAP message, Axis2 invokes the BFT-WS Out 
Handler during the user phase, and invokes the Rampart (Nadalin et al. (2004))handler for message signing 
during the security phase. Then, the message is passed to the HTTP transport sender to forward to the target 
endpoint. During the inflow of a SOAP message, Axis2 first invokes the default handler for preliminary 
processing (to find the target object for the message based on the URI and SOAP action specified in the 
message) during the transport phase, it then invokes the Rampart handler for signature verification during the 
security phase. This is followed by the invocation of the BFT-WS Global In Handler during the dispatch phase. 
This handler performs tasks that should be done prior to dispatching, such as duplicate suppression at the server 
side. If the message is targeted toward a BFT-WS-enabled service, the BFT-WS In Handler is invoked for 
further processing during the user-defined phase, otherwise, the message is directly dispatched to the Axis2 
message receiver. Michael et.al (2005) presents a Thema which consists of a client library (Thema-C2RS), a 
BFT service library (Thema-RS), and an external service library (Thema-US). Each of these libraries provides 
support for the standard multi-tier Web Service programming model and SOAP communication. 
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The proposed work analyzes the faults that are received from various replicas by applying Byzantine agreement. 
Whenever there is a fault, the client receives the SOAP Fault from all the replicas, applies Byzantine agreement, 
identifies the erroneous replica and eliminates it. The processes involved in this model are replication 
management and eliminating the faulty replica. 
In the real time scenario many composite Web services are involved while processing the client’s request.  
The response to the client is based on the individual response as provided by each intermediary service.  If any 
of the services provide a negative response by denying the request, as per the distributed environment paradigm 
all the responses of the other services are discarded and an exception message is sent as a response to the client.  
The service that behaves differently from other services may not be a genuine one i.e. the service is exhibiting 
Byzantine behaviour and it is an untrusted one.  Each service participating in processing the client’s request 
sends a response to the primary or controlling service.  Based on the set of responses, the primary service has to 
send an appropriate response to the client.   
A replica manager is developed for managing and controlling the Web services.  When the primary server is 
crashed the client’s request is forwarded to other available replicas.  The participating replica may sometimes 
behave abnormally by generating illegitimate response.  The response generated by this faulty replica is 
dispatched to the client.  Faulty responses may lead to business loss, customer dissatisfaction, loss of reputation 
and various other factors.  To avoid the problems of this nature, message from all the replicas are received for 
identifying the presence of Byzantine fault and to eliminate the faulty service.   
An enhanced methodology is adopted for handling Byzantine faults in the SOAP fault messages.  Figure 1 
shows replication manager that coordinates primary and secondary services.  Replication (Liu 2008) is the 
redundant fault tolerant mechanism adopted in distributed systems to make the service available to the client 
even in the presence of crash.  In the proposed model, the replica manager requests controls the replicas of the 
server.  The replicas that offer similar kind of services are grouped together and referred to as “Service Group”.  
The service that receives requests from the client is referred to as “primary service”.  When the primary service 
is crashed the control is transferred to the replication manager.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The replication can be passive or active. The replication manager uses active replication technique for 
processing the requests when the primary server is crashed.  In active replication technique, all the replicas 
receive the request, process the request and forward the response to the replication manager.  As each replica 
service sends a response, the replication manager has to make a decision (referred to as agreement) on the values 
received.  In the received responses there may be some replica(s) exhibit Byzantine behaviour by generating 
faulty responses.  The replica manager is to identify the faulty replica and eliminate the same by applying 
Lamport’s algorithm for tolerating Byzantine faults.  Once these faults are eliminated the client receives the 
fault free response.   
When all the services agree upon an exception message, SOAP fault is the response sent to the client.  In 
some situations the service that exhibit Byzantine behaviour dispatches an exception message that is similar to 
non-faulty services.  In this situation the faulty and non-faulty services cannot be distinguished as all the 
services throw an exception message and it becomes difficult to identify the abnormal service.  To eliminate the 
faulty node, the SOAP fault messages are to be analyzed.  The Web services may be developed using any of the 
technology, Java based application programming interfaces like Remote Method Invocation (RMI), Enterprise 
Java Beans (EJB), Web Servlets, Java Server Pages (JSP), Model View Controller (MVC) using Struts, 
Hibernate etc., Microsoft based languages like Visual Basic, Visual C++, ActiveX Server Pages (ASP), .NET 
Framework etc., or any other programming languages like PERL, COBOL etc.,  All these programming 
request  /
response 
request 
response 
failure 
response 
Fig. 1. Replication Management 
Si – Secondary Replicas 
Primary Service (SP)  Client  Replication Manager 
 
Service Group 
S1  S2  Sn  ….. 
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proposed methodology is adaptable for Web services developed using any programming approach. 
6.  Classification of SOAP Faults 
Each category of generic SOAP Fault has been analyzed and the application of Byzantine agreement algorithm 
is detailed as follows. 
6.1. MustUnderstand 
When a SOAP message is received by the node (intermediate or ultimate receiver) it has to examine Header 
element to check any intermediate processing is to be done here in this node. This is applicable if the 
mustUnderstand attribute is set to “1”.  If the node is not recognizing the header block then the fault code 
MustUnderstand is generated.  The SOAP message of MustUnderstand is given below:  
 
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">  
 <env:Body> 
  <env:Fault> 
   <faultcode>env:MustUnderstand</faultcode> 
      <faultstring>Mandatory header block not understood.</faultstring> 
   <faultactor>Faulty  URI</faultactor> 
   <detail>header</detail> 
  </env:Fault> 
 </env:Body> 
</env:Envelope> 
 
Many intermediate services are involved in processing a request.  Depends on the requirement some of the 
intermediary services may be ignored and in some situations the request should be processed by these 
intermediary services.  When the intermediary services unable to process the request the MustUnderstand fault 
is triggered.  In any system before processing the client’s request the authentication details of the client is 
verified.  The following code fragment shows the header of the SOAP request message by incorporating the 
MustUnderstand attribute.  
 
<env:Envelope  xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <env:Header> 
  <vendor:authentication  xmlns:vendor="urn:creditcard:vendor"  soap:mustUnderstand="1"> 
  <vendor:vendorname>Name  of  the  Vendor</vendor:vendorame> 
  <vendor:vendorcode>Vendor  ID</vendor:vendorcode> 
  </vendor:vendor> 
 </env:Header> 
</env:Envelope> 
 
When the authentication service is unable to validate the client’s identity the following message is generated 
by the intermediate processing service. 
 
<faultcode>env:MustUnderstand</faultcode> 
<faultstring>Mandatory header block not understood.</faultstring> 
<faultactor>urn:creditcard:vendor</faultactor> 
<detail>UnknownVendor</detail> 
6.2. VersionMismatch 
The VersionMismatch SOAP fault code is generated whenever there is a difference in the namespace of 
envelope element of SOAP message.  In SOAP envelope the namespace “http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-
envelope” specifies the SOAP version 1.2.  The elements supported in SOAP version 1.2 are either not available 
or not compatible with SOAP version 1.1.  When there is a SOAP version mismatch between the client and 
request the following message is dispatched. 
 
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">  
 <env:Body> 
  <env:Fault> 
   <faultcode>env:VersionMismatch</faultcode> 
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   <faultactor>URI  of  Faulty Node</faultactor> 
   <detail>Message  was  not  SOAP  1.1-conformant</detail> 
  </env:Fault> 
 </env:Body> 
<env:Envelope> 
 
In the intermediary services, if the message transferred by the node adopts SOAP version 1.2 and the 
receiving service works with SOAP 1.1 version then the fault VersionMismatch is dispatched. 
6.3. DataEncodingUnknown 
The SOAP fault code DataEncodingUnknown is available in SOAP Version 1.2.  In the SOAP request or 
response message when the XML is unable to parse the message content then the SOAP fault 
DataEncodingUnkonwn is triggered.   
 
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">  
 <env:Body>   
  <env:Fault>   
   <faultcode>env:DataEncodingUnknown</faultcode>   
   <faultstring>Nonconformance  to WSDL definition</faultstring>  
   <faultactor>URI  of  the faulty node</faultactor> 
   <detail>Data  Encoding  Format  not  recognized</detail> 
  </env:Fault>   
 </env:Body>   
</env:Envelope> 
 
Several encoding formats are available for handling SOAP messages.  If the intermediary node is not capable 
of parsing these encoding formats then the SOAP fault DataEncodingUnknown is generated.   
6.4. Sender  
When incorrect SOAP request message is dispatched by the client then the fault code “Sender” of SOAP version 
1.2 is dispatched.  In SOAP version 1.1 this fault is identified as “client”.  The fault code “Sender” is usually 
generated when the message transferred with lack of information or invalid data.  The fault code specifies the 
root cause of the error message. 
 
<env:Fault>  
<faultcode>env:Sender</faultcode>  
<faultstring>Invalid data</faultstring>  
<optional sub codes can be created for specifying the detailed fault information/> 
</env:Fault> 
 
In a Credit card validating service, the SOAP request sent by the client should carry valid credit number as 
per the required format.  The request is not validated by the service provider when the request message contains 
any special characters and the response carries the fault code “Sender”. 
<env:fault> 
<faultcode>env:Sender</faultcode> 
<faultsubcode>exh:invalidCharacters</faultsubcode> 
<faultstring>Card number contains invalid characters</faultstring> 
<faultdetail>Contains Special Characters </faultdetail> 
</env:fault> 
    
The response message also carries the specific reason pertaining to the fault. 
6.5. Receiver 
The requested message could not be processed for several reasons.  One such reason is that the intermediary 
node may not available for processing the request at that instance.  When the intermediary service is available 
the response may be processed even at a later stage.   
 
<env:Fault>  
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<faultstring>Unable to process</faultstring>  
<optional sub codes can be created for specifying the detailed fault information/> 
</env:Fault> 
  
When the intermediary node for verifying the balance of a customer’s account in a bank is not available then 
the response to the client is as follows: 
 
<faultcode>env:Receiver</faultcode> 
<faultstring>Unable to find the service balanceCheck</faultstring> 
<faultreason>Online Service is down for maintenance.  Try later</faultreason> 
 
The response message carries the fault message with the appropriate reason to the client.  When the 
replication manager receives the responses from the replicas, the replication manager has to analyze the received 
response. The received responses are received into four categories. As a first case, when all the replicas have 
sent the responses and if all the values are equal then no further processing is required i.e. all the replicas are 
producing similar results and the services are not exhibiting Byzantine behaviour.  In the second case when all 
the received values are not equal, then many replicas are producing incorrect results and by applying Byzantine 
agreement algorithm faulty replicas are identified and eliminated.  In the next case, when a response from one of 
the replica is not matching with the others (where other replicas produces similar results) then the replica that 
produces a different response is the identified as fault replica.  Finally, when some of the replicas are producing 
different values and some replicas producing equal results then apply Byzantine agreement algorithm and 
identify the faulty replicas. The procedure is given as follows: 
 
(1) Collect the entire SOAP Fault from the replicas and perform the following:  
case i: ((all) SFi = SFj) 
   all the replicas produced similar results. No further processing is required.  
case ii: ((all) SFi <> SFj)  
               Byzantine failure occurred; all the replicas are producing incorrect results. Apply Lamport’s  
algorithm Byzantine agreement and identify the faulty replicas. 
case iii: ((any of) SFi <> SFj ) 
                 eliminate Rj being the replica producing incorrect result. 
case iv: ((some of) SFi <> SFj) 
   Apply Byzantine agreement algorithm and eliminate the fault replicas. 
 
(2) select maximum((equal)SFi) as the correct response and dispatch it to the client. 
 
where  
Ri – i
th replica 
SFi is soap fault value that is received from the replica Ri. 
The replication manager receives different set of values for every type of SOAP fault.  The value of SFi 
depends on the type of SOAP fault message. In MustUnderstand SOAP fault the intermediate node (actor) is 
responsible for generating the fault and hence the element “fault actor” is returned by the replica.  For 
VersionMismatch SOAP fault, “fault string” is returned as it carries the SOAP version (1.1 or 1.2).  The 
DataEncodingUnknown SOAP fault, it is the intermediate node which is unable to process and hence the “fault 
actor” is returned.  For sender and receiver SOAP fault messages detailed fault message is required.  Hence for 
these SOAP faults the fault sub codes are returned as response messages.  The procedure for handling the 
messages of various SOAP faults for each replica is given as follows: 
 
if soapfault = env:MustUnderstand then 
        SFi = (faultactor) SOAPFault.mustUnderstand(Ri) 
else if soapfault = env:VersionMismatch then 
        SFi = (faultstring) SOAPFault.versionMismatch(Ri) 
else if soapfault = env:DataEncodingUnknown then 
        SFi = (faultactor) SOAPFault.dataEncodingUnknown (Ri) 
else if soapfault = env:Sender then 
        SFi = (faultdetail) SOAPFault.sender(Ri) 
else if soapfault = env:Receiver then 
        SFi = (faultdetail) SOAPFault.receiver(Ri) 
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Byzantine behaviour among the replicas.  Figure 2 depicts the flow of faulty messages from the replicas to the 
replication manager to determine the presence of Byzantine faults. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The replication manager is capable of reaching the agreement when there is response from many replicas and 
they are not capable of handling Byzantine faults.  The proposed approach reaches an agreement and transmits 
the fault free response to the client even in the presence of Byzantine faults.   
7.  Implementation 
A set of interfaces has been created for implementing the proposed approach for handling Byzantine faults by 
applying Lamport’s algorithm.  The interfaces are ServiceFactoryInterface,  FaultNotifierInterface, 
SOAPFaultInterface, ReplicaManagerInterface and BFTInterface. 
7.1 ServiceFactoryInterface 
The interface defines a ServiceFactory, to manage the list of services that offer similar kind of applications.  The 
interface is capable of creating a new service, activates or deactivates a service and undeploys the service.  For 
each service a unique ID is allotted.  The applications are implemented using SOAP communication model and 
deployed in a Web Application server. 
 
interface ServiceFactoryInterface { 
   Service serviceCreate(serviceID); 
   Status serviceActivate(serviceID); 
   Status serviceRemove(serviceID); 
}; 
7.2 ReplicaManagerInterface 
ReplicaManager interface manipulates the replicas by adding, removing and the location of the replica server is 
maintained.  Each and every replica is assigned with unique identification number.  To create replicas and 
manage them, a HTTP Web server is used.  The system is configured tested with both vertical and horizontal 
replication techniques.  For vertical replication the replicaLocation method in the interface is not required. 
 
interface ReplicaManagerInterface { 
   Replica addReplica(replicaID); 
   Replica  removeReplica(replicaID); 
   Location replicaLocation(replicaID); 
}; 
7.3 FaultNotifierInterface 
The interface FaultNotifier identifies the malfunctioning replica and faulty replica.  The replica ID of the faulty 
replica is returned. 
Ri, SFi  Decision 
SOAP  
response 
SOAP  
request 
SF1  SF2 SF3 SFn
S1  S2  S3  Sn 
Replication Manager 
Lamport Algorithm 
Fig. 2. Byzantine Agreement for SOAP Faults 
 
Ri     – i
th Replica 
SFi   – SOAP Fault received from the i
th replica. 
BFT – Lamport’s Algorithm for Byzantine Fault Tolerance
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interface FaultNotifier { 
   Replica faultyReplica(replicaid); 
}; 
7.4 BFTInterface 
The interface BFT applies Lamport’s algorithm for Byzantine fault tolerance.  Replicas are created for all the 
nodes and messages are transmitted among themselves.  All the broadcast messages are processed and the faulty 
process (replica id) is identified and reported to the replication manager. 
 
interface BFT { 
   Node addNode(replicaID); 
   Message broadcastMessages (Message, replicaID); 
   process(Message); 
   Replica faultyNode(replicaID); 
}; 
7.5 SOAPFaultInterface 
The SOAPFault interface retrieves the faults that are generated by the replicas.  The methods defined are for 
returning the faultactor element for mustUnderstand and dataEncodingUnknown, faultdetail for 
versionMismatch, sender and receiver SOAP faults. 
 
interface SOAPFaultInterface { 
   faultactor  mustUnderstand(); 
   faultactor dataEncodingUnknown(); 
   faultstring versionMismatch(); 
   faultdetail sender(); 
   faultdetail receiver(); 
}; 
8.  Conclusion 
The algorithm for handling the SOAP Faults in transparent manner by applying Byzantine algorithm is been 
proposed. For every type of SOAP Fault generated is analyzed and is processed accordingly. By using this 
approach the faulty replicas are eliminated and the client is assured with the authenticity of the received 
message. The client side overhead in processing the BFT algorithm is shown by varying the number of replicas. 
The number of messages that are communicated between the replicas is also shown. This model works in a 
blocked manner. This model may be extended to work in an asynchronous manner. In this model, the messages 
transmitted between the replicas are not signed one, the same algorithm may be extended to work for signed 
messages. As this model involves collection of results from all the replicas which leads to redundancy, 
complexity of the algorithm and increased computation cost. Hence the solution proposed is only for mission 
critical applications in which the cost of doing this process is well justified. 
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